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ABSTRACT 
 
Emerging trends in cyber system security breaches in critical cloud infrastructures 
show that attackers have abundant resources (human and computing power), expertise 
and support of large organizations and possible foreign governments. In order to greatly 
improve the protection of critical cloud infrastructures, incorporation of human behavior 
is needed to predict potential security breaches in critical cloud infrastructures. To 
achieve such prediction, it is envisioned to develop a probabilistic modeling approach 
with the capability of accurately capturing system-wide causal relationship among the 
observed operational behaviors in the critical cloud infrastructure and accurately 
capturing probabilistic human (users’) behaviors on subsystems as the subsystems are 
directly interacting with humans. In our conceptual approach, the system-wide causal 
relationship can be captured by the Bayesian network, and the probabilistic human 
behavior in the subsystems can be captured by the Markov Decision Processes. The 
interactions between the dynamically changing state graphs of Markov Decision 
Processes and the dynamic causal relationships in Bayesian network are key components 
in such probabilistic modelling applications. In this thesis, two techniques are presented 
for supporting the above vision to prediction of potential security breaches in critical 
cloud infrastructures. The first technique is for evaluation of the conformance of the 
Bayesian network with the multiple MDPs. The second technique is to evaluate the 
dynamically changing Bayesian network structure for conformance with the rules of the 
Bayesian network using a graph checker algorithm. A case study and its simulation are 
presented to show how the two techniques support the specific parts in our conceptual 
approach to predicting system-wide security breaches in critical cloud infrastructures. 
ii 
Index terms- Critical cloud infrastructures, security breaches, pro-active protection, 
predictive defense, probabilistic reasoning, Markov decision process, Bayesian network 
structure conformance, and probabilistic human behaviors
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Chapter 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
Emerging trends in cyber system security breaches in critical cloud 
infrastructures, such as military, finance, etc. show that major threats to critical cloud 
infrastructures are from large organizations and in some cases by foreign governments 
[1]. The sophistication of attacks reflect that the attackers are not limited by human 
resources and computing power. Hence, there is an urgent need to develop proactive 
defense approaches to protecting critical cloud infrastructures. 
The security challenges in cloud infrastructure include insider threats, outsider 
malicious attacks, data loss, issues related to multi-tenancy, cryptographic key ownership, 
loss of control and service disruption [2]. Many of these challenges are addressed by 
existing reactive defense techniques, but require relatively large computational resources 
to apply all of them. 
Most proactive defense existing approaches to protecting cyber infrastructures 
with predictive capability are based on applying game theory to generate adversarial 
models. All these approaches have difficulties of rationality and based on assumption that 
defender is always able to detect attacks. Some approaches also have difficulty of Nash 
equilibrium. 
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Additional difficulties in the approaches using game theory include the following: 
These approaches are not scalable with realistic sizes and complexity of the 
infrastructures. It is difficult for these approaches to capture the information on 
probabilistic human behaviors accurately. In addition, in these approaches, it is assumed 
that the actions of players (attackers and defenders) are synchronous, but it is not always 
the case. 
A conceptual approach with predictive capability has been proposed [3] to enable 
the critical cloud infrastructures to prevent and mitigating security breaches efficiently. A 
framework has been proposed to use Markov Decision Process (MDP) and Bayesian 
network (BN) to predict system-wide security breaches based on the subsystem level 
security breaches and probabilistic human behaviors with respective time windows, in 
which security breaches are most likely to occur. 
 
1.2 Contribution 
 
 The interactions between the dynamically changing state graphs of the 
MDPs of the subsystems of the critical cloud infrastructure and the dynamic causal 
relationships in BN of the critical cloud infrastructure is a key component to success in 
the approach [3]. In my thesis, two techniques are presented for supporting the prediction 
of potential security breaches in critical cloud infrastructures.  The first technique is for 
evaluation of conformance of Bayesian network with the stochastic probabilistic model 
of each subsystem. The second technique is to evaluate the dynamically changing 
Bayesian network structure for conformance with the rules of the Bayesian network using 
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a Graph Checker Algorithm. A case study and its simulation are presented to show how 
the two techniques support the specific parts for the prediction of system-wide security 
breaches in critical cloud infrastructure. 
 
1.3 Organization of Thesis 
 
 The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 describes the current state of art for 
predicting security breaches in critical infrastructure. In Chapter 3 the conceptual 
approach for predicting security breaches in critical cloud infrastructure is discussed. In 
Chapter 4, the technique for evaluating the conformance of system-wide Bayesian 
network with the stochastic probabilistic model of each subsystem of our solution is 
presented. In Chapter 5, the technique for evaluation of the dynamically changing 
Bayesian network structure for conformance with the rules of the Bayesian network using 
our graph checker algorithm is presented. In Chapter 6, a case study and its simulation 
results are presented to show how the two techniques support the specific parts for the 
prediction of system-wide security breaches in critical cloud infrastructures. Finally, the 
conclusion and future research will be discussed in Chapter 7.  
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Chapter 2 
 
CURRENT STATE OF ART 
 
2.1 Game Theory Approaches 
 
Most existing approaches to protecting cyber infrastructures with predictive capability 
are based on applying game theory to generate adversarial models. [4 - 10] All these 
approaches have difficulties of rationality and based on assumption that defender is 
always able to detect attacks. Some approaches also have difficulty of Nash equilibrium 
[4, 5].  
The difficulties of rationalities in game theory is the assumption that all entities 
(user(s) and attacker(s)) make decisions rationally, in this case “rationally” means each 
entity wants to cause maximum damage with each decision the entity makes. This is not 
always the case.  
In game theory, the Nash equilibrium is a solution concept of a non-cooperative game 
(players making independent decisions) involving two or more players, in which each 
player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no player 
has anything to gain by changing only the player’s own strategy.  
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Additional difficulties in approaches using game theory include that the game theory 
approaches are not scalable with realistic sizes and complexity of the infrastructures, that 
it is difficult to capture probabilistic human behaviors accurately, and that they all assume 
the actions of players (attackers and defenders) are synchronous, but it is not always the 
case. 
 
2.2 Attack Graph Approaches 
 
Attack graph approaches are deterministic and use graph models for predicting 
possible attacks on IT infrastructures. MulVAL, NetSPA, GARNET and NAVIGATOR 
[11] are deterministic attack graph tools to model possible attacks on IT architectures 
using the output from network vulnerability scanners and the group policy of the 
infrastructure being analyzed. Each vulnerability identified by such tools is associated 
with a probability that represents how likely an attacker can successfully exploit it. The 
probability of successfully exploiting such a vulnerability by an attacker is denoted by the 
access-complexity value provided by the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (NVD) 
and the intuition by the domain expert of the IT infrastructure using the tool. The 
drawback of these approaches are based on the estimation of the output from 
vulnerability scanners,  important attacks (e.g., by social engineering and discovery of 
novel vulnerabilities, such as zero-day attacks) and the effectiveness of defenses (e.g., 
antimalware and host firewalls) need to be depicted manually by the end-user. They also  
treat all identified vulnerabilities as directly exploitable by the attackers. This is a 
problematic assumption as various factors related to successful exploitation are not 
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gathered by network scanners, such as effectiveness of intrusion detection systems and 
attacker knowledge. These tools also do not include probabilistic human/operational 
behaviors in the IT infrastructure. 
 
2.3 Probabilistic Modelling Approaches 
 
The following probabilistic modelling approaches have been used to predict security 
and reliability issues.  
 In [12 - 16], a probabilistic modelling approach for SCADA and power systems is 
presented to ensure that the power transmission systems remain at the acceptable 
reliability levels with various load by predicting failures on various generator and 
the random failures of system equipment. 
 A thread-driven quantitative framework, called Three Tenets, was developed for 
secure cyber-physical system design and assessment by predicting attacks using 
Bayesian Network [17]. 
 An approach to situation assessment was developed for helping decision makers 
in intelligent operations and large-scale crisis management using Bayesian and 
Credal networks [18].  
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 A probabilistic reasoning modeling technique was developed using stochastic 
Petri Nets to understand the tradeoff between information security and operational 
performance in parallel distributed application environments focusing on moving 
target defense and deceptive defense tactics [19]. This technique generates a more 
secure platform by increasing the ratio of deceptive to operational nodes by 
changing the attack surface (the points of contact of attackers).  
 
The difficulties encountered in these approaches [12 – 19] include that they do not 
capture human behaviors, they cannot detect co-related attacks, and they do not 
incorporate an attacker model.  In addition, these approaches do not incorporate human 
factors, and hence the predictive capability is limited.  
 
2.4 Approaches to Learning the Bayesian Network from  
Stochastic Probabilistic Models 
 
Learning the Bayesian network from stochastic probabilistic models is required in 
Step 1) of our conceptual approach to construct the initial Bayesian network. There has 
been a number of approaches to learning the Bayesian network from data [20], and 
among these, a method to construct a Bayesian network from dependency network is 
presented. However, the generation of an optimal Bayesian network from a dependency 
network by is NP-hard. This method uses a heuristic technique to remove cycles in a 
greedy algorithm to get a Bayesian network. The generated Bayesian network uses a 
scoring function to calculate the Bayesian network structure with the least score, i.e. the 
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removal of a set of edges that has least effect on the Bayesian network prediction 
accuracy. The results of this approach showed experimentally that the Bayesian networks 
produced from dependency network has a prediction accuracy almost equaling that of 
Bayesian networks learned from data directly using standard datasets. Such techniques do 
not learn Bayesian network from more complex systems such as the MDPs, also this 
heuristic method cannot be applied for a dynamically changing MDPs and Bayesian 
network because of the computational complexity of the greedy approach. 
In [21] a technique called structured policy iteration is introduced to represent 
stochastic actions in an MDP using Bayesian networks, together with a decision-tree 
representation of rewards using approximation techniques. This obviates the need for 
state-by state computation, aggregating states at the leaves of these trees and requiring 
computations only for each aggregate state. It does explain how best to prune the 
decision-tree and the pruning is strongly influenced by the variable ordering in the tree. 
Also, the classification technique applied for finding the smallest decision tree is not 
feasible in dynamically changing MDPs due to computational complexity. This technique 
learns Bayesian network only from a single MDP and not suitable for our problem of 
generating Bayesian network from multiple MDPs. 
The above techniques have high computational complexity and do not learn Bayesian 
network from multiple MDPs to solve our problem. In chapter 4, we show our approach 
for evaluation of the conformance of the Bayesian network with multiple stochastic 
probabilistic models.  
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2.5 Approaches to Verification of the Bayesian Network 
 
Evaluation of the dynamically changing Bayesian network is required in Step 1) 
and Step 3) of our approach to verify the conformance between the Bayesian network and 
the Bayesian properties. 
In [22] a technique called the Minimum Feedback Arc Set is presented to detect 
and remove all cycles of a directed acyclic graph. The solution is NP-hard and hence not 
applicable in practical applications. Also this technique does not consider the Conditional 
Probability Distribution requirements of a child node in a Bayesian network with respect 
to the number of parent nodes for a particular child node. Hence this technique cannot be 
used to solve our problem of verify the conformance of a Bayesian network. 
 In Chapter 5, we will present an approach to verify the conformance of a 
Bayesian network by developing a Graph Checker Algorithm to solve our problem of 
evaluating the dynamically changing Bayesian network structure. 
 
The following is a list of drawbacks of the existing approaches discussed above: 
For approaches with predictive capability based on game theory,  
1. Rationality is assumed, but the attacker does not always have the make the most 
damaging move. 
2. Nash equilibrium is assumed, but the attackers and defenders can be benefited by 
changing strategies. 
3. Not scalable with realistic sizes and complexity of the infrastructures. 
4. Difficult to capture probabilistic human behaviors accurately. 
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5. Actions of players (attackers and defenders) are assumed to be synchronous. 
 
For approaches using attack graphs,  
6. Do not capture personalized probabilities, the probabilities in the transaction 
matrix of MDP subsystems after reinforcement learning for critical cloud 
infrastructures. 
7. Vulnerability probabilities are manually input by an expert into the attack graph 
approach, the dynamic nature of critical cloud infrastructure forces the expert to 
determine all vulnerable probabilities again on the next prediction of attack graph 
approaches.  
8. Successful attacks might not be gathered by network scanners and other 
vulnerability detection mechanisms which provide input to the attack graph 
approaches.  
9. Attack graph approaches treat all identified vulnerabilities as directly exploitable 
by the attacker. CVSS, CVE values are not personalized for a particular cloud 
environment. 
10. Successful exploitation is not gathered by network scanners such as effectiveness 
of intrusion detection systems and attacker knowledge. 
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Chapter 3 
 
CONCEPTUAL APPROACH 
 
 Emerging trends in cyber system security breaches in critical cloud 
infrastructures, such as in military, finance, etc. show that major threats to critical cloud 
infrastructures are from large organizations and in some cases by foreign governments 
[23]. The sophistication of attacks reflect that the attackers are not limited by human 
resources and computing power. Hence, there is an urgent need to develop proactive 
defense approaches to protecting critical cloud infrastructures. In my thesis, two 
techniques are presented for supporting the approach presented in [3] to predict system-
wide security breaches by the Bayesian network and the probabilistic human behavior in 
the subsystems is captured by the Markov Decision Processes of potential security 
breaches in critical cloud infrastructures.  A case study and its simulation are presented 
including the above 2 techniques to show the results of the conceptual approach to 
predicting system-wide security breaches in critical cloud infrastructure. 
 The security challenges in cloud infrastructure include insider threats, outsider 
malicious attacks, data loss, issues related to multi-tenancy, cryptographic key ownership, 
loss of control and service disruption [24]. Many of these challenges are addressed by 
existing techniques, but require relatively large computational resources to apply all of 
them. In addition, security challenges for critical cloud infrastructures include:  
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- C1) User-centric Security Systems: Incorporating users’ preferences and 
behaviors, including certain degrees of prediction of human behaviors, is needed for 
developing user-centric security systems for critical cloud infrastructures.   
- C2) Emergence of Software Defined Network (SDN): From security point of 
view, the centralized control structure of SDN is its most serious disadvantage because 
moving the network from relatively decentralized structure to centralized controller 
environment will significantly increase the risk of potential single point of attack and 
causing catastrophic failure. 
- C3) Overhead for Security Measures:  High efficiency and speed of many tasks of 
critical cloud infrastructures are required for reliable and quick response. Hence, the 
security measures for critical cloud infrastructures must introduce little overhead, 
especially because current security measures need to run all the time when the critical 
cloud infrastructures are in service. 
 To address these challenges, an effective conceptual approach with predictive 
capability is proposed in [3] to enable the critical cloud infrastructures to prevent and 
mitigating security breaches efficiently. In such approaches, accurate predictive 
capability, accurate threat assessment and operational behavioral modelling of the critical 
cloud infrastructures are necessary. Probabilistic human behaviors affect the system 
operational behavior, a frameworks is introduced using MDP and Bayesian network to 
facilitate the capturing and analyses of probabilistic human behaviors accurately and 
efficiently. 
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MDPs is viewed as a stochastic automata where, an MDP state is the representation of 
the state of the system and actions in the MDP represent the uncertainty of inducing 
stochastic transitions between MDP states. The expected value of a certain course of 
action is a function of the transitions it induces between states, with rewards associated 
by moving to an MDP state. Plans can be optimized by policy iteration [25] or value 
iteration [26] over a fixed finite period of time. These make MDPs ideal models for 
capturing and analyses of probabilistic human behaviors accurately and efficiently for 
critical cloud infrastructures [27 - 30] 
 
Bayesian network [31 - 33] is a framework for representing a probability distribution 
in factored form. It is represented by a directed acyclic graph with vertices corresponding 
to random variables and a directed edge between two variables indicating a direct 
probabilistic dependency between them. A Bayesian network also reflects implicit 
independencies among the variables. The Bayesian network must have a probability 
distribution for each immediate parent vertex conditioned on it. In addition the network 
must include a marginal distribution for each vertex that has no parents. The probability 
of any event over the Bayesian network is computed using algorithms [34] that exploit 
the independencies represented in the graph structure. 
 
In this conceptual approach [3] we use probabilistic techniques, such as Bayesian 
network and MDP to predict system-wide security breaches based on the probabilistic 
inputs on subsystem level security breaches. The conceptual approach will be time based, 
and generate probabilistic predictions of system-wide and sub-system security breaches 
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with the respective time windows, in which breaches are most likely to occur. The 
domain expert will analyze the network of the critical cloud infrastructure accurately, and 
provide the information to the state construction algorithms using a data specification 
language.  
A critical cloud infrastructure may have multiple subsystems and the number of 
subsystems is determined by the application (domain knowledge). Each subsystem may 
or may not be connected to other subsystems directly but are required to communicate 
with the Bayesian network, either directly or indirectly which is run on a centralized 
system or a subsystem connected to all the subsystems. The Bayesian network will 
monitor all the events which occur across subsystems, and predict system-wide security 
breaches using the following steps: 
 
Step 1) Based on system state dependencies of critical cloud infrastructure (identified 
from application domain knowledge), construct and evaluate system-wide BN and state 
graphs of subsystem MDP. The probabilities in MDPs and BN can be set with arbitrary 
initial values and updated in next steps. The domain expert determines the threshold for 
probability of occurrence of each known security breach  
 
Step 2) Monitor the critical cloud infrastructure to observe its operational behaviors, 
including human behaviors.  Update the MDP and BN state graphs based on causal 
relationships among the observed operational behaviors using Bayesian probability 
estimation algorithm (BPEA) and MDP probability estimation algorithm (MPEA). 
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Step 3) Check the conformance of the BN structure with Bayesian properties, MDP 
state graph structure with Markovian properties and to each other. Update BN and MDP 
state graphs  
 
Step 4) Estimate accuracy of probabilities in MDP and BN state graphs by deploying 
the MDPs and BN of critical cloud infrastructure “passively”, and then insert known 
security vulnerabilities in the infrastructure  
Repeat Steps 2) to 4) until the probabilities in the state graphs of MDPs and BN are 
tuned to a point where the accuracy of the prediction of system breaches is deemed “good 
enough” by the system administrator to be deployed in real-time.  
 
Step 5) Run the MDPs and the BN inference engine to predict security breaches at 
subsystem level and system-wide level, respectively, along with a time window. If the 
probability of a predicted security breach exceeds the specified threshold in Step 1) for 
the security breach, the security breach is predicted as to occur soon  
 
In this thesis we focus on the following: 
 Step 1), evaluation of conformance of the system-wide Bayesian network with 
subsystem MDPs. 
  Step 3), Check the conformance of the BN structure with Bayesian properties 
by developing a Bayesian network Graph Checker Algorithm. Also used in 
Step 1).  
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 Step 5), A case study and its simulation are presented including the above 2 
techniques to show the results of the conceptual approach to predicting 
system-wide security breaches in critical cloud infrastructure. 
 
Our conceptual approach intends to address these drawbacks as follows: 
1. We address drawback 1 and 2 by using the personalized probabilities of 
transaction matrix for MDP Subsystems to make decisions, and not finding 
equilibrium and only predicting the best possible move by attacker.  
2. Drawback 3 is addressed by divided MDP into subsystems, reducing the MDP 
states compared to a single system-wide MDP. 
3. Not having the assumptions made in drawback 1 & 2 allows MDP to efficiently 
capture human actions and operational behaviors, solving drawback 4 & 5.  
4. Drawback 6 is addressed in our conceptual approach by utilizing the subsystem 
MDP to capture human and operational behavior of a particular MDP subsystem 
by modified reinforcement learning in Steps 2) – 4) in our approach.  
5. Drawback 7 is not completely mitigated by our conceptual approach, a domain 
expert still has to input data into our system but his involvement is highly reduced 
as we require him to only provide input in the Step 1) and selected special case 
instances in the subsequent steps (such as non-conformance of MDP and 
Bayesian network).  
 
 
 
 17 
6. We also assume the attacks are detected and the applied defense mechanisms are 
efficient according to drawback 8 and 10, but if the expert is not sure about the 
applied defense mechanisms he can input his uncertainty by changing the 
probability values. 
7. Drawback 9 is addressed by MDP capturing values specific to a subsystem. Here 
the effect of a particular global CVSS or CVE is modified by the probability 
values captured by the subsystem.  
 
Other major advantages of our conceptual approach: 
1. Our prediction approach uses MDP for subsystems prediction and Bayesian 
network for system-wide prediction. The MDP captures human/operational 
behavior and predicts subsystem breaches based on the current state only, while 
the Bayesian network predicts/infers system-wide security breaches based on the 
entire network of vulnerable states.  
2. Anomaly based detection mechanisms integrate well into our approach as the 
uncertainty of anomaly based approaches can be represented by probability values 
of MDPs and Bayesian network conditional probabilities. 
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Chapter 4 
 
EVALUATION OF CONFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM-WIDE BAYESIAN 
NETWORK WITH THE STOCHASTIC PROBABILISTIC MODEL OF EACH 
SUBSYSTEM 
 
This chapter explains the technique used to evaluate the conformance of system-
wide Bayesian network from the subsystem MDPs. In 4.1 we present the approach to 
check the conformance of Bayesian network with multiple subsystem MDPs and its 
pseudocode. In 4.2 we present an illustration of our approach. 
 
4.1 The Evaluation Technique 
 
Here we show part of Step 1) and 3) of our conceptual approach for evaluation of 
system-wide Bayesian network with MDPs. An MDP state is a representation of the state 
of the critical cloud infrastructure. Ex: different possible configuration states of the 
firewall, different group policies etc. States with high reward values in the MDP are 
vulnerable states. The vulnerable states in each subsystem running MDP are used to 
construct the Bayesian network. Each vulnerable state is a node in Bayesian network. 
Due to dynamic change in the operational behavior in subsystem and the causal 
relationship in the Bayesian network such a conformance check is required. To check the 
conformance between the MDPs and the BN the following rules should be in valid in the 
BN between the MDPs.  
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• Rule 1: Every MDP vulnerable state must be a unique Node in the BN. 
• Rule 2: If there exists a direct path between 2 MDP vulnerable states. The two 
MDP states must be in the Markov blanket of each other in the BN. The states in 
the MDP which have a relationship in the subsystem are not independent of each 
other in the BN, hence these vulnerable states should be in the Markov blanket of 
each other.  
• Rule 3: BN should not contain other non-vulnerable MDP states. 
Markov blanket: 
• Of a node is the parents, its children, and its children's other parents.  
• The nodes in the blanket are the only knowledge needed to predict the behavior of 
that node. 
 
• Stage 1:  
• Vulnerable MDP states reward threshold T, subsystem MDPs and the BN 
is passed as input. 
• Stage 2: 
• Iterate each MDP subsystem and its States,  
• if the reward value for the MDP state is greater than the threshold T, it is 
identified as a vulnerable state 
• Check Rule 1 by checking if MDP State is present in BN (either by Map 
or naming convention). 
• Store vulnerable state to check for Rule 2. 
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• Stage 3:  
• Loop each MDP subsystem vulnerable state and check for Rule 2. 
• Direct path between two vulnerable MDP states is checked by iterating 
over the transaction matrix of the specific MDP vulnerable states.  
• Stage 4:  
• The BN is verified for Rule 3 by subtracting the System-wide security 
breaches from the BN and comparing it to the amount of MDP vulnerable 
states. 
 
Pseudocode below shows the algorithm to evaluate the BN to be verified for 
conformance with subsystem MDPs. The validated graph is the Bayesian network. 
Input for the below pseudocode are as follows,  
- MDP[n] all MDP subsystems. 
- BN the Bayesian network constructed but not verified 
- T the threshold for vulnerable states based on reward value. 
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Algorithm: Conformance between BN and MDPs 
1. BN_MDP_ Conformance (MDP[n], BN, T) 
2.     initialize vulnerableStateCount =0; 
3.     Initialize systemWideCount =0; 
4.     Initialize VulnerableStates[n][]; 
5.     Boolean isMarkovBlanket; 
6.     Loop reward set R{S1:r1,  S2:r2, …} for each subsystem MDP[j] 
7.         if Reward ri >= Threshold provided by Domain expert T of state Si 
8.             vulnerableStateCount ++; 
9.             V = Get Node MDP[j]_Si from BN 
10.             if V = null                                                      // Rule 1 
11.                  return Error Vulnerable state in MDP[j]not added in BN 
12.             vulnerableStates[i][k++]     // K=0 for each new MDP subsystem 
13.     End Loop      
14.     Loop vulnerableStates[i] and size(vulnerableStates[i] > 1)  for each MDP subsystem 
15.           isMarkovBlanket = IsMarkovBlanket(vulnerableStates[i][]) // Rule 2  
16.           if isMarkovBlanket = false 
17.                return Error nonconformance of Rule 2 
18.     End loop      
19.       Loop BN nodes for SW_[i]  
20.         systemWideCount++; 
21.     if (size(BN) – systemWideCount) != vulnerableStateCount) 
22.          return Error BN contains states that are not vulnerable   
 
Algorithm: Conformance between BN and MDPs – Rule 2 
1. isMarkovBlanket(vulnerableStates[j]) 
2.     Loop k each element in vulnerableStates array 
3.             if transactionMatrix[vulnerableState[k]] contains any of vulnerableStates[0 to 
m] 
4.                               // direct dependence but not self. 
5.                if not markovBlanket(vulnerableState[k],vulnerableState[m]); 
6.                      return Error not in Markov blanket direct dependence. 
            
Figure 1: The Pseudocode for Evaluating the Conformance of the Bayesian Network of a 
Critical Cloud Infrastructure with the MDPs of its Subsystem  
 
 
End of Technique 1 generates a Graph G from the MDPs. 
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Time complexity of the above algorithm is O(vd) 
- v is the number of vulnerable states 
- d is the dependencies of each vulnerable state v given by the domain expert. 
 
4.2 An Illustrative Example 
 
In this section, we illustrate the process of evaluation for the conformance of 
Bayesian network from the stochastic probabilistic model. Consider the critical cloud 
infrastructure of the bank handling online personal transactions has 4 subsystems. 
 
The MDP of subsystem 1 is constructed from the initial state dependencies from the 
domain expert as shown in figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: The MDP State Diagram of a Subsystem 
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A Markov decision process (MDP) is a 4-tuple: <S, A, P, R> i.e. states, actions, 
transaction matrix and rewards respectively 
In our illustration (Figure 1), 
• S is a finite set of states i.e.{S0, S1, S2, S3} 
• A is a set of actions available from each state in S  
 {S0:[a0,a1], S1:[a0,a1], S2:[a0,a1], S3:[a1]}, 
 Where each state has two possible actions a0, a1 except S3which only has actiona1 
• P is a transaction matrix containing the probability that action a in state Si at 
time t will lead to state Sj at time t+1, represented by  
 Pa(Si, Sj) = P(St+1 = Sj | St = S, at = a)  
 
 
State\Action a0 a1 
S0 [0.5, S0], [0.5,S2] [1.0, S2] 
S1 [0.1, S0], [0.7,S1],[0.2,S2] [0.05, S2], [0.95,S1] 
S2 [0.4, S0], [0.6,S2] [0.3, S0], [0.3,S1],[0.4,S3] 
S3   [0.6,S1],[0.4,S3] 
 
Table 1: The Transaction Matrix of the MDP Subsystem shown in Figure 2 
 
• R(s) is the immediate reward (or expected immediate reward) received after 
transition to state s 
 R = [S0 = -0.5], [S1 = -0.5], [S2 = +5.0], [S3 = +5.0] 
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State 1: 
The threshold for vulnerable states in the MDP is set to +0.3 by the Domain expert. 
Stage 2: 
MDP State 2 and MDP State 3 are identified as vulnerable states in MDP subsystem 1 
because of high reward values. The Identified vulnerable states in MDP subsystem are 
verified to exist in the Bayesian network.  
Vulnerable states S2 and S3 are stored to check rule 2. 
There exists a direct path between MDP state S2 (BN node 1) and S3 (BN node 5) 
through action a1, hence they must be in the Markov Blanket of each other in the BN. 
Here both BN nodes 1 & 5 are parents of the same child 9 BN node; therefore they are in 
the Markov blanket of each other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The Nodes and their Description of Bayesian Network shown in Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
BN node Description
1,2 Vulnerable states in MDP Subsystem 1
3,4 Vulnerable states in MDP Subsystem 2
5,6 Vulnerable states in MDP Subsystem 3
7,8 Vulnerable states in MDP Subsystem 4
9 - 14 Probable System-wide security breaches
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Stage 3: The Identified vulnerable states in the MDP are added to the graph using the 
algorithm shown in next section. If there is no error thrown from the algorithm i.e. all the 
values in the dependency map are correct, the below graph is generated shown in Figure 
3. 
The following is a partial dependency map from Domain expert:  
Dependency map = {[Sub1_S2:SW_9, SW_10], [Sub1_S3: SW_11], …} 
Here, 
- Sub1_S2 is the State S2 in subsystem 1 having a dependency to System-wide 
breach SW_9 and SW_10. 
- Sub1_S3 is the State S3 in subsystem 1 having a dependency to System-wide 
breach SW_11 
 
 
Figure 3: The State Graph of a System-wide Bayesian Network of the Critical Cloud 
Infrastructure 
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Table 3: The Conditional Probability Distribution of the Bayesian Network shown in 
Figure 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Node conditional probability distribution (CPD)
1 [0.9, 0.1]
2 [0.9, 0.1]
3 [0.9, 0.1]
4 [0.9, 0.1]
5 [0.8, 0.2]
6 [0.9, 0.1]
7 [0.8, 0.2]
8 [0.9, 0.1]
9 [1.0, 0.9, 0.9, 0.7, 0.9, 0.8, 0.95, 0.7, 0.3, 0.05, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.9]
10 [1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9]
11
[1.0, 0.9, 0.9, 0.7, 0.9, 0.7, 0.9, 0.95, 0.05, 0.1, 0.1,
 0.3, 0.1, 0.3, 0.3, 0.9]
12 [1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9]
13 [1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9]
14 [1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9]
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Chapter 5 
 
EVALUATION OF THE DYNAMICALLY CHANGING BAYESIAN NETWORK 
STRUCTURE  
  
5.1 Graph Checker Algorithm and Pseudocode 
 
The verification of the Bayesian network/graph with the rules of the Bayesian 
network structure is required because of the need to verify the conformance of the initial 
graph generated from the MDP subsystems in Stage 3 of chapter 4 and due to the 
dynamically changing Bayesian network structure in Step 3) of our conceptual approach. 
Rules of Bayesian Network structure are: 
Rule 1: BN is a Directed Acyclic Graph. 
Rule 2: Each child node of the Bayesian network should have 2 power (number of 
parents+1) entries in its conditional probability distribution (CPD) considering the 
each node has Boolean entries in CPD (The most common representation [31 - 
33]). In some cases it is 2 power (number of parents) depending on optimized 
representation. 
Rule 3: All the vulnerable states in each MDP subsystem i.e. the nodes in the 
Bayesian network should be connected either directly or indirectly to all nodes in 
the BN. 
The nodes in the loops of the Bayesian network and unconnected nodes should be 
notified to Domain Expert. 
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A recursive function is used to find the cycle in the Bayesian network and to check 
connectivity using a Depth First Search approach. The recursive function returns both the 
cycle in the graph if present and also the nodes not connected in the graph. 
 
Stage 1: Provide the graph to be verified for conformance to the isBayesian() 
function. Create arrays Vertex_marker and Stack_marker of the size of the graph. The 
Vertex_marker and Stack_marker represent the nodes connected in the graph and the 
current nodes in the possible cycle respectively.  
Stage 2: Loop for each node in the graph in isBayesian() function for each node ‘n’ it 
returns the node ‘n’ if the node does not have the appropriate number of CPT entries in 
the node (line no. 7 in pseudocode) or if the node is not connected (line no. 9 in 
pseudocode by checking inDegree and outDegree of node)  it the Bayesian network. Here 
Rule 2 and Rule 3 are checked.  
The isBayesian() function then calls the recursive DFS isCycle_util() function if the 
node has not been visited. The isCycle_util() function performs DFS on a node and 
returns True if a cycle is present and also returns the possible nodes in the cycle. If no 
cycle is present it returns false with all the nodes visited. Here Rule 1 is checked. 
Stage 3: If the above isBayesian() function returns True, It also returns a list of nodes 
of the graph containing all the possible nodes in the loop. DFS is performed on one of the 
nodes to extract the exact list of elements and their direction. Else If there is no cycle the 
isBayesian() function returns False and null. To satisfy Rule 3, the indegree and 
outdegree of the graph are considered the same to perform a Depth or Breadth first search 
to check for connectivity of the graph. If all the nodes are visited the graph is connected.   
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If there is more than one loop the algorithm needs to be run again till all loops are 
detected and eliminated by the domain expert. 
The Time complexity of this function is O(n+e) 
- Where n is the number of nodes in the Graph G 
- E is the number of edges in the graph 
Algorithm to check conformance of Bayesian network  
1. def isBayesian(Graph G): 
2.     Set vertex_marker[size(G)] to False 
3.     Set stack_marker[size(G)] to False 
4.     Loop each node n in G: 
5.         parents_count = getInDegree(n) 
6.         if(parents_count != (2^parents_count+1) 
7.             return False,Null,n          // CPT of node ‘n’ not in conformance 
8.         if vertex_marker[n] is False: 
9.             if isCyclic_util(G, n, vertex_marker, stack_marker) function returns True 
10.                 return True, stack_marker,Null 
11.     return False, Null,Null 
 
 
12. def isCyclic_util(Graph G, node n, vertex_marker, stack_marker): 
13.     Set vertex_marker[n] to True 
14.     Set stack_marker[n] to True 
15.     loop neighbors ‘i’ of n in G: 
16.         if vertex_marker[i] is false and isCyclic_util(G, i, vertex_marker, stack_marker) is 
True: 
17.             return True 
18.         else if stack_marker[i] is True: 
19.      return True 
20.     Set stack_marker[n] to False 
21.     return False 
 
 
Figure 4: The Pseudocode of the Graph Checker Algorithm for Evaluating the 
Conformance of the Bayesian Network with the Bayesian Properties 
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5.2 An illustrative Example 
Illustration 1: 
Consider Figure 5 shown below is the graph to be verified for conformance with the rules 
of Bayesian network.  
Stage 1: Arrays Vertex_marker and Stack_marker is set to size 10 and initialized 
to false.  
Stage 2: The isBayesian() function is called and it checks if Rule 2 and Rule 3 for 
each iteration of each node, if conformance to Rule 2 and Rule 3 fails it returns the node.  
Then the isCyclic_Util function is called and it returns True if the DFS on the node finds 
a cycle along with a list of nodes marked True in the Stack_marker function. The nodes 
marked True are Node 4, Node 8, Node 2, Node 3 and Node 7. Here the graph is 
connected and we assume the CPD is correct (Illustration 2 shows this test case).  
Stage 3: A DFS is performed on one of the nodes marked True. When two 
duplicate nodes are detected by the DFS, the cycle and its direction is notified to the 
domain expert. The cycle retrieved here is between nodes 8 -> 2 -> 3 -> 7 ->8. 
 
Figure 5: The Updated Bayesian Network to be Verified for Conformance with 
Bayesian Network 
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Illustration 2: 
 
Consider Figure 6 shown below is the graph to be verified for conformance with the rules 
of Bayesian network.  
Stage 1: Arrays Vertex_marker and Stack_marker is set to size 14 and initialized 
to false.  
Stage 2: The isBayesian() function is called on each iteration it checks the 
conditional probability distribution table of each node. Here node 9 has 3 parents and 
should consist of 3^4 i.e. 16 CPD values. It contains only 14 values, this node is returned 
by the isBayesian() function.  
Stage 3: Node 9 is notified to the domain expert and is requested to fix the CPD 
values of node 9. 
 
Figure 6: The State Graph of the Bayesian Network to be Verified for Conformance 
with Bayesian Properties 
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Table 4: The Conditional Probability Distribution of the Bayesian Network shown in 
Figure 6 
 
 
Illustration 3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Node conditional probability distribution (CPD)
1 [0.9, 0.1]
2 [0.9, 0.1]
3 [0.9, 0.1]
4 [0.9, 0.1]
5 [0.8, 0.2]
6 [0.9, 0.1]
7 [0.8, 0.2]
8 [0.9, 0.1]
9 [1.0, 0.9, 0.9, 0.7, 0.9, 0.95, 0.7, 0.3, 0.05, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.9]
10 [1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9]
11
[1.0, 0.9, 0.9, 0.7, 0.9, 0.7, 0.9, 0.95, 0.05, 0.1, 0.1,
 0.3, 0.1, 0.3, 0.3, 0.9]
12 [1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9]
13 [1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9]
14 [1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9]
Figure 7: The Bayesian Network for the Critical Cloud Infrastructure 
of Illustration 3 
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The BN is in illustration 3 is disconnected.  
Consider Stage 1 and 2 are valid as shown in previous illustration.  
Stage 3: To check the connectivity of the BN we perform a DFS on any node by 
considering the BN to be an undirected graph.  
To do this the indegree nodes and the outdegree nodes of a particular node is passed 
to the stack of the DFS as shown in algorithm above.  
A count is made on the nodes visited and checked against the size of the BN.  If there 
is a difference between the two then the graph is disconnected. Here there is a 
difference of 4. 
The advantages here are you do not have to create a new undirected graph from the 
existing directed graph since we only check for connectivity of the network.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 34 
Chapter 6 
 
CASE STUDY AND SIMULATION FOR THE TECHNIQUES  
 
6.1 Overview of the Case Study 
 
In this section a case study and simulation is conducted to show the prediction of 
security breaches in online personal transactions in a bank critical cloud infrastructure 
using the two techniques presented in chapter 4 and 5. The MDP subsystem prediction 
code is programmed in Python v2.7 and the Bayesian network system-wide prediction 
code is programmed in Matlab v2012b. Section 4.2 shows the case study of using online 
personal transactions in a bank critical cloud infrastructure and the simulation of the 
predictive capability of the critical cloud infrastructure. The simulation focuses on Step 
1), the construction, Steps 1) & 3), verification of the Bayesian network and Step 5), the 
prediction of our approach including the two techniques presented in section 4 and 5.  
 
6.2 Simulation Results 
 
The case study of online personal transactions in a bank critical cloud infrastructure 
implementing our predictive conceptual approach is shown below. The critical cloud 
infrastructure consists of four subsystems (Figure 8):  
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Figure 8: The Critical Cloud Infrastructure of Bank application 
 
– Subsystem 1 provides interface of the bank for personal transaction services to all 
its customers. It also checks possible attacks from customers’ input, such as DoS, CSRF, 
XSS and SQL injections, but does not store customers’ identity and personal transaction 
data. It forwards the validated requests to Subsystem 3. 
– Subsystem 2 stores anonymized customers’ transaction data received from 
Subsystem 3 and sends acknowledgement back to Subsystem 3. 
– Subsystem 3 revalidates customers’ requests, processes transactions and sends the 
transaction data in anonymized form for storage in Subsystem 2. It stores customers’ 
identity and transaction data.  It also sends responses of customers’ requests to Subsystem 
1. 
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– Subsystem 4 performs business analysis of customers’ transaction data for bank 
employees, using anonymized customers’ data in Subsystem 2 
 
 The below steps shown the simulated values of the case study according to steps 
of our conceptual approach shown in background section. 
  
Step 1) Based on system state dependencies of critical cloud infrastructure 
(identified from application domain knowledge), construct the MDP state graphs of all 
subsystems.  
 
In Subsystem 1, the following 4 features are identified by the domain experts’ 
initial state dependencies.  
 
Feature 1: The rate of unsuccessful login [Values: high, low] 
Feature 2: The firewall configuration [Values: good, bad] 
Feature 3: The IDS state [Values: running, stopped] 
Feature 4: Bank application process queue [Values:  good condition, stopped] 
 
The possible values of the above features of subsystem 1 and their meaning are: 
Feature value a: The rate of unsuccessful login attempts is low 
Feature value b: The rate of unsuccessful login attempts is high 
Feature value c: The firewall configuration is good 
Feature value d: The firewall configuration is bad 
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Feature value e: The IDS is running normally 
Feature value f: The IDS is unable to process data or has been stopped 
Feature value g: Bank application process queue is in good condition. 
Feature value h: Bank application process queue has been stalled 
 
The 4 features of MDP subsystem 1 and their 2 possible values for each feature 
results in a total of 2
4
 states in MDP subsystem 1. The possible states and the feature 
values of each state are given below in table 5 
In practical implementations the number of states is reduced in MDP using 
approximation techniques [34 - 37] to combine similar states specific to the critical cloud 
infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
State Feature value 
1 
Feature value 
2 
Feature value 
3 
Feature value 
4 
State 1 A c e g 
State 2 A c e h 
State 3 A c f g 
State 4 A c f h 
State 5 A d e g 
State 6 A d e h 
State 7 A d f g 
State 8 A d f h 
State 9 B c e g 
State 10 B c e h 
State 11 B c f g 
State 12 B c f h 
State 13 B d e g 
State 14 B d e h 
State 15 B d F g 
State 16 B d F h 
 
Table 5: The States and their Features in MDP Subsystem 1 of the Case Study   
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The MDP actions of subsystem 1 are: 
A0: users attempt to login to system 
A1: Change in firewall configuration 
A2:  Change in IDS state 
A3: Change in the size of requests 
The action set containing the states and the actions possible from each state is 
shown below:  
A = {[S1: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S2: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S3: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S4: A0, A1, 
A2, A3], [S5: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S6: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S7: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S8: A0, 
A1, A2, A3], [S9: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S10: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S11: A0, A1, A2, A3], 
[S12: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S13: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S14: A0, A1, A2, A3], [S15: A0, A1, 
A2, A3], [S16: A0, A1, A2, A3]} 
 
State Diagram of MDP subsystem 1 is shown in the figure 9:  
The state diagram consists of states of MDP subsystem 1 and the possible actions 
from each state shown in Figure 9. For better visibility self-loops have not been shown in 
the state diagram. They are shown in the transaction matrix below.  
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Figure 9: The State Diagram of MDP Subsystem 1 of the Case Study 
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Table 6: The Transaction Matrix of MDP Subsystem 1 of the Case Study 
 
The transaction matrix shows the resultant state when an action is performed from 
a particular state.  
State\ 
Action 
A0 A1 A2 A3 
S1 [s9:0.2][s1:0.8] [s5:0.3][s1:0.7] [s3:0.5][s1:0.5] [s2:0.6][s1:0.4] 
S2 [s10:0.3][s2:0.7] [s6:0.5][s2:0.5] [s4:0.3][s2:0.7] [s4:0.3][s2:0.7] 
S3 [s11:0.3][s3:0.7] [s7:0.4][s3:0.6] [s1:0.5][s3:0.5] [s4:0.3][s3:0.7] 
S4 [s12:0.2][s4:0.8] [s8:0.6][s4:0.4] [s2:0.3][s4:0.7] [s3:0.5][s4:0.5] 
S5 [s13:0.5][s5:0.5] [s1:0.5][s5:0.5] [s7:0.1][s5:0.9] [s6:0.2][s5:0.8] 
S6 [s14:0.7][s6:0.3] [s10:0.4][s6:0.6] [s8:0.3][s6:0.7] [s5:0.4][s6:0.6] 
S7 [s15:0.3][s7:0.7] [s3:0.3][s7:0.7] [s5:0.1][s7:0.9] [s8:0.4][s7:0.6] 
S8 [s7:0.4][s8:0.6] [s6:0.6][s8:0.4] [s6:0.5][s8:0.5] [s7:0.8][s8:0.2] 
S9 [s1:0.7][s9:0.3] [s5:0.4][s9:0.6] [s11:0.3][s9:0.7] [s10:0.3][s9:0.7] 
S10 [s2:0.8][s10:0.2] [s14:0.7][s10:0.3] [s12:0.6][s10:0.4] [s9:0.1][s10:0.9] 
S11 [s3:0.3][s11:0.7] [s7:0.6][s11:0.4] [s9:0.2][s11:0.8] [s12:0.6][s11:0.4] 
S12 [s4:0.6][s12:0.4] [s16:0.2][s12:0.8] [s10:0.5][s12:0.5] [s11:0.2][s12:0.8] 
S13 [s5:0.5][s13:0.5] [s9:0.6][s13:0.4] [s15:0.5][s13:0.5] [s14:0.4][s13:0.6] 
S14 [s6:0.6][s14:0.4] [s10:0.2][s14:0.8] [s16:0.2][s14:0.8] [s3:0.6][s14:0.4] 
S15 [s7:0.6][s15:0.4] [s11:0.6][s15:0.4] [s13:0.7][s15:0.3] [s6:0.8][s15:0.2] 
S16 [s8:0.4][s16:0.6] [s12:0.2][s16:0.8] [s14:0.2][s16:0.8] [s15:0.5][s16:0.5] 
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The reward attained when you reach a certain state is shown by the reward matrix. 
The high rewards here represent the vulnerable states. The threshold for a reward state 
being a vulnerable state is provided by the domain expert, here it is set to +15. 
  
R = {S1:-0.5, S2:-0.5, S3:-0.5, S4:-0.5, S5:-0.5, S6:-0.5, S7:-0.5, S8:-0.5, S9:-0.5, S10:-
0.5, S11:-0.5, S12:-0.5, S13:+10, S14:+75, S15:+55, S16:+100} 
 The vulnerable states in MDP subsystem 1 are S14, S15 and S16. The terminal 
states defined by the domain expert are S14 and S16. The terminal states are highly 
vulnerable states in the MDP subsystem.  
 
Similarly subsystem 2, subsystem 3 and subsystem 4 MDPs are constructed in 
Step 1) of our conceptual approach using the initial state dependencies provided by the 
domain expert.  
 
Using the information from the MDPs vulnerable states and the domain experts 
the Bayesian network is generated, validate the Bayesian network with MDPs as shown 
in Chapter 4, then also use the GCA shown in chapter 5 to check the conformance of the 
generated Bayesian network. The initial Bayesian network is generated after executing 
these two steps. The domain expert sets the security breach threshold to 0.6.  
 
Step 2) Monitor the critical cloud infrastructure of the bank to observe its 
operational behaviors, including human behaviors.  Update the MDP and BN state graphs 
based on causal relationships among the observed operational behaviors using Bayesian 
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probability estimation algorithm (BPEA) and MDP probability estimation algorithm 
(MPEA). 
 
Step 3) Check the conformance of the BN structure with Bayesian properties 
using the approach shown in Chapter 5. Also check the conformance of the MDP state 
graph structure with Markovian properties and to each other as shown in chapter 4.  
Update BN and MDP state graphs. 
 
Step 4) Estimate accuracy of probabilities in MDP and BN state graphs by 
deploying the MDPs and BN of critical cloud infrastructure “passively”, and then insert 
known security vulnerabilities in the infrastructure.  
- Repeat Steps 2) to 4) until the probabilities in the state graphs of MDPs and BN 
are tuned to a point where the accuracy of the prediction of system breaches is 
deemed “good enough” by the system administrator to be deployed in real-time. 
 
The System-wide Bayesian network deemed good enough by the system 
administrator is shown below:  
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Figure 10:  The System-wide Bayesian Network at the end of Step 4) of 
Conceptual Approach of Case Study  
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Node conditional probability distribution (CPD) 
S1_14 [0.9, 0.1] 
S1_15 [0.9, 0.1] 
S1_16 [1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95,  0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9] 
S2_5 [0.9, 0.1] 
S2_9 [0.8, 0.7, 0.3, 0.2] 
S2_14 [0.9, 0.2, 0.8, 0.1] 
S3_10 [0.8, 0.2] 
S3_11 [0.8, 0.3, 0.7, 0.2] 
S3_12 [0.8, 0.3, 0.7, 0.2] 
S3_16 [0.1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95,  0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9] 
S4_3 [0.9, 0.1] 
S4_7 [0.9, 0.1] 
S4_11 [0.1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9] 
S4_15 [0.9, 0.8, 0.2, 0.1] 
SW_1 [0.1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95, 0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9] 
SW_2 [0.1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.1,  0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9] 
SW_3 [0.1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.1,  0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9] 
SW_4 [0.1, 0.9, 0.9, 0.7, 0.9, 0.7, 0.7, 0.7, 0.05, 0.1, 0.1, 0.3, 0.1, 0.3, 0.3, 0.9] 
SW_5 [0.1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.1,  0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9] 
SW_6 [0.1, 0.8, 0.8, 0.95,  0.05, 0.2, 0.2, 0.9] 
 
Table 7: The Conditional Probability Distribution of the Bayesian Network of the 
Case Study shown in Figure 10 
 
Here S1_14 to S1 _15 are vulnerable states in the MDP subsystems similar to data 
shown in table 5. These are observed nodes in the Bayesian network.  
 
The states SW_1 to SW_6 are unobserved nodes who represent system-wide 
vulnerabilities involving multiple MPD subsystem such as DDoS attack as a deviation to 
conduct a malicious transaction involving multiple subsystems, configuration change by 
an internal employee (operational activity or malicious activity) leading to remote file 
execution etc. The probabilities of the unobserved nodes are inferred by the BN inference 
engine.  
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Step 5) To predict security breaches at subsystem level and system-wide level, 
first the policy iteration [37] is performed on each MDP subsystem at a certain time with 
the MDP agent starting at the current MDP State of critical cloud infrastructure. The 
MDP agent represents the action to be taken at each state in critical cloud infrastructure 
during policy iteration. The result of the policy iteration on a particular MDP subsystem 
is the predicted path the attacker takes from one MDP State to the next MDP State in 
each time step the attacker takes to reach his goal in the MDP subsystem. The attacker 
reaches his goal when the MDP agent reaches a terminal MDP state. A terminal MDP 
state is a highly vulnerable MDP state defined by the domain expert. For MDP subsystem 
1, the terminal MDP states are S14 and S16. 
Consider the critical cloud infrastructure is currently in state S7 and we begin 
policy iteration on each MDP subsystem. The path taken by the attacker in MDP 
subsystem 1 is predicted to be: S7 -> S11-> S15-> S16. This is calculated by the policy 
iteration [38] which maximizes the reward received according to the state diagram of the 
MDP subsystem 1. Here the vulnerable states activated in the Bayesian network are S15 
and S16. Policy iteration gives the best action to take for each State. We use this 
information to go to the next state.  
Similarly, the policy iteration on MDP subsystem 2, MDP subsystem 3 and MDP 
subsystem 4 is run to find the vulnerable states reached by the attacker in each subsystem. 
Table 8 shows the vulnerable states reached (Boolean value True in BN) in each MDP 
subsystem. 
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Subsystem Vulnerable States reached 
1 S15, S16 
2 S5, S9 
3 S10, S11, S16 
4 S4, S15 
 
Table 8: The Vulnerable States Reached in Each MDP Subsystem of the Case Study 
 
Based on the vulnerable states reached by the attacker in each MDP subsystem 
the Bayesian network inference engine is run to detect system-wide security breaches. 
The probability of a predicted security breach exceeds the specified threshold 0.6 set in 
Step 1) for the security breach, the security breach is predicted as to occur soon. Figure 
11 shows the system-wide security breach prediction on each node of the Bayesian 
network. 
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Figure 11 The Predicted System-Wide Security Breach at end of Step 5) of Conceptual 
Approach of Case Study 
 49 
 The system-wide security breach prediction alerts that System-wide vulnerability 
1 has a 0.60 probability of occurring soon. 
Similarly, rewards, transaction matrix and agent start location were changed and 
vulnerabilities were introduced in the critical cloud infrastructure of bank to predict 
security breaches. This simulation consists of 20 to 30 states in each subsystem and 20 – 
25 nodes in the system-wide Bayesian network. The two techniques shown in Chapter 4 
and 5 were implemented in each of the MDP subsystems and the system-wide BN.  
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Chapter 7 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, two techniques have been presented to support the conceptual 
approach [3] to predicting security breaches in critical cloud infrastructures. The first 
technique is for evaluation of the conformance of the Bayesian network with the multiple 
MDPs. The second technique is to evaluate the dynamically changing Bayesian network 
structure for conformance with the rules of the Bayesian network using a graph checker 
algorithm. The simulation of part of the conceptual approach presents the prediction 
results of the conceptual approach using the above two techniques. The conceptual 
approach can be applied in other applications where modelling human behaviors in large 
and complex systems are required. The challenges shown in Chapter 3 are addressed by: 
• Incorporation of probabilistic human behaviors in Step 2) of the conceptual 
approach, and involvement of the domain expert in Step 1) (off-line) will help the 
conceptual approach address challenge C1) User-centric Security Systems 
• Predictive nature of the conceptual approach will enable selectively applying 
certain security measures based on predicted breaches, and hence the operational 
overhead of using the approach may not be more than that of existing approaches 
without predictive capability.  This will help the conceptual approach address 
challenge C3) Overhead for Security Measures 
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• Challenge C2) Emergence of Software Defined Network (SDN) is not addressed 
in the conceptual approach, but it can be reduced by incorporating fail safe 
mechanisms, such as controller hardening, and robust policy framework. 
 
7.2 Future Research 
 
The following research tasks need to be completed for deployment of our conceptual 
approach to predicting security breaches in critical cloud infrastructures.  
• Develop an effective data specification language for domain experts to provide 
their input in our conceptual approach. 
• Generate the probability metrics for the causal relationship among security 
breaches in Bayesian network, and state dependencies among the states in the 
MDP. 
• Develop effective techniques to construct, check and update the state graphs of 
the MDP using an efficient MDP graph checker algorithm. 
• Develop an efficient way for frequent updating the probabilities and the state 
graph structures of the MDP and Bayesian network. 
• Adding global variables to the Bayesian network such as threat intelligence and 
external factors outside the critical cloud infrastructure to improve prediction 
accuracy needs to be researched.  
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